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INTRODUCTION
Economic relationships differ in many dimensions such as uncertainty, verifiability and measurement of performance/quality, the frequency of trade, and the relationship-specificity of assets. This heterogeneity of relationships defies a unified approach, as evidenced by the limited success of a vast literature using standard principal-agent models in explaining real-world contracting practices. These models assume that court ordering with respect to performance is efficacious, thus rule out attribute ambiguities and idiosyncrasies associated with the supply of a good or service. As Hart and Holmstrom (1987) note, the complex piece rate contracts of the type derived in this literature are at odds with the observed simplicity of most real-world contracts.2 Furthermore, casual observations suggest that contracts are mostly incomplete; what varies from one relationship to another is the degree of incompleteness.3 There is now a growing literature stemming from Alchian and Demsetz (1972) , Williamson (1985) to Hart and Moore (1988) , Farrell and Shapiro (1989) and, in a labor context, MacLeod and Malcomson (1988) , focusing on institutional arrangements that emerge when complete contracts are not feasible. This paper builds on this literature.
We study a long-term buyer-seller relationship with the following three main facets: i) some important aspect of trade, called "quality" is not contractible; ii) the DYNAMICS OF INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS 665 tracts should there be? How does hidden information affect the buyer's welfare when there is an unsolvable hidden action problem?7 Besides providing answers to these questions in our framework, we explore the thesis that learning about innate values plays an important role in the choice of governance structures. We show, endogenizing both the length and the number of contracts, that this learning process and the dynamic interaction between noncontractibility and two-dimensional hidden information yields contractual arrangements with an appealing simplicity. In Section 2, we describe the model and discuss simple contractual arrangements. The buyer is willing to build a trade relationship with the high innate value seller but a single long-term contract is a very poor means of achieving this goal. In order to avoid other seller types, the buyer must choose a governance structure consisting of a sequence of contracts that specify each but one price-duration pair (noncommitment.) Section 3 derives the optimal number of these contracts. In this relationship, one out of two contracts that specify the same price and leave the buyer's beliefs about the seller's innate value unchanged should be redundant.
Assuming that parties use their contracting possibilities efficiently, we show that more than two contracts for the entire relationship is of no use to the buyer. For screening reasons, the buyer keeps the price of the first contract below the outside option of the seller, thus a seller type who rejects the second contract would be better-off rejecting the initial one. When seller types foresee this, a second screening (more than two contracts) becomes unnecessary.
We model the relationship as a dynamic game in Section 4. We adopt perfect Bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept, viewing the initial contract offer and continuation choices as the buyer's strategies, and the initial acceptance choice and effort levels as the seller's strategies. It is shown that prices and durations increase from one contract to the next, and the price specified in the first (respectively last) contract must be inferior (respectively superior) to the seller's outside option. In equilibrium, only the high innate value seller accepts and reveals his type at the end of the optimal first contract, and the relationship converts into a bilateral trade under perfect information. Most importantly, the first contract produces a competition between seller types. Because effort can be substituted for innate value, the seller exerts effort to convey type-related information and thereby to improve his Crawford 1988, for example) and the information lag required to assess performance (Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom 1990) . Another reason recognized for the predominance of short-term (probationary) contracting arises under hidden information and unverifiable performance: type-related and peiformance-relevant uncertainty should be resolved before parties settle down for a long-term contract.
The treatment in this model differs from others in that the number and durations of contracts are endogenized and the seller's type is decomposed into two components.
7 Generally, these questions are either irrelevant or have trivial answers in a world of complete contracts. When parties can specify all future contingencies, when all aspects of the trade are verifiable and information is perfect, a single long-term contract covering the entire planning horizon achieves efficiency. Informational problems may lead to inefficient outcomes, but mechanisms and incentive schemes are available to vitiate these hidden information and hidden action problems. These results do not extend to the case of incomplete contracts because the underlying enforcement mechanisms are absent.
bargaining power to negotiate a favorable second contract.8 As a result, the buyer enjoys a high quality during the first contract. There is a trade-off however: a higher quality obtains at a higher price or a shorter duration. Next, in Section 5, we show that the buyer may even be better-off with respect to the case in which the seller's type is common knowledge. The potential for this somewhat surprising result lies again in contract incompleteness and the use of effort to convey type-related information.
Section 6 studies the commitment case where all contractible variables are specified in advance for the entire planning horizon, except that the buyer makes continuation choices at some interim, prespecified dates. These are long-term contracts that may encompass many periods with different durations and prices.
We show that such commitments invite opportunism, not effort. Under these contracts, the seller modifies his strategy so as to systematically leave the buyer indifferent between continuation and quitting at the corresponding decision node.
Section 7 concludes the paper, discusses the results and extensions.
THE MODEL
We consider a principal (buyer)-agent (seller) relationship where some aspects of the trade, say, the buyer's idiosyncratic needs, are not contractible. We loosely call these aspects "quality." The buyer consumes one unit per period of the good manufactured by the seller and trade occurs continuously in time. The buyer cares about the quality of the good q, and the price p. Her per-period utility is given by v = q -p. On the other hand, during his relationship with the buyer, we assume that the effort x and innate value 0 of the seller affect quality through the following simple technology:
Effort is thus a substitute for innate value. Only the seller knows his twodimensional type, {0, t3}, where 0 represents innate value and ,3, a parameter measuring the convexity of the effort-disutility function. The following distributions of 0 and ,3, however, are common knowledge:
(D1) 0 = OH with probability r-, and 0 = OL with probability 1 -r; (D2) ,3 is distributed on [/3,8,3] , with continuous density function strictly positive.
There will be no loss of generality in assuming (Dl) and (D2) rather than a joint distribution.9 We have OH > OL', so (Al) implies a comparative advantage for the x-(,/3) is increasing in /3. This should account for different technologies tha types have available to improve quality. In a labor context, for example, hardworking employees would have high /3-values; these would have a higher effort capacity and be able to sustain a given level of effort for a longer period (or a higher level of effort given the period.) It is therefore possible for a OL-seller to outperform a OH-seller provided that the latter has his /3 relatively low. In the case of labor services, less talented but hardworking employees can, by exerting sufficient effort, perform better than highly talented but effort-averse employees. This interaction 10 Simplicity of presentation motivates the assumptions of the model. Additivity of quality in effort and innate value, and linearity of the seller's utility in price can be dropped, and the utility function of the buyer can be replaced by v(q, p), a function increasing in q and decreasing in p. These weaker assumptions are all that is needed for Propositions 1 through 4. between 0 and ,3 is an important factor behind our results on the relation between durations and prices of incomplete contracts.
Parties discount the future at the same rate r, and their planning horizon is infinite. So U = E f e rt [p -d(,3; x) ] dt and V = E f eCt[0 + x -p] dt shall denote respectively the seller's and the buyer's expected discounted utility.
The seller's outside option provides the discounted utility U?. We shall define p, a price which yields the seller exactly U0 under a long-term contract, by rx (1) U0 = f e -`p dt = plr. V0 shall denote the buyer's discounted utility from her outside option. Initially, the buyer makes an incomplete, all-or-nothing contract proposal which the seller accepts or rejects.'" Prices and durations are verifiable, so acceptance turns the proposal into a contract binding only with respect to the price, duration and delivery. Because quality is not contractible, prices are ex ante independent of the quality the buyer may obtain. Consider first a single long-term contract covering the entire planning horizon. To induce participation, the price for this contract cannot be lower than p; nor is it profitable to increase price beyond p because quality will not be affected. Hence, this contract offers U?, leaving all types of the seller indifferent. The buyer, on the other hand, obtains 00 Oi -P (2) vi =|et[0i -p] dt= -Jo -r where i = L, H. We shall assume VL < trade if the seller's innate value is OL. But because VH > V?, the relevant question for the buyer is how to screen the seller given the incompleteness of contracts. We shall consider two contracting modes that serve this purpose, namely, the commitment and the noncommitment case. The commitment case corresponds to longterm contracts Cc {(PI, T1); (P2, T2); ... }, meaning that the parties agree in advance on that the price p I will prevail until date T1 , P 2 between T1 and T1 + T2 and so on. In the noncommitment case, however, the contract specifies only the actual price-duration pair, i.e., no commitment is ever made for prices and durations beyond the termination date of the actual contract. The relationship is therefore carried through a sequence of contracts, Ci = {pi, Ti}. Even though future contract terms are not explicitly spelled out in the noncommitment case, parties can infer what future contracts will specify as a function of the situation prevailing at the time those contracts will be made explicit. Revelation of type-information will play an important role in this process. date TI. The terms of the first contract, {pi , TI}, must restrict the access to "bad"
seller types (especially OL-sellers) who would exert no effort and take along a net benefit from the relationship. The discounted utility accruing to these types from accepting the first contract should not exceed their outside opportunity, which is stated in (4). Using (1), it simplifies to (4') PI ?P.
(5) is a participat "good" seller type positive level of effort x* to signal their innate value, and the relationship must provide them an expected discounted utility at least as high as U0. The buyer's problem as stated in (3), (4) and (5) is not well-defined because V(,u1 ) and U(T1 ) are not specified explicitly. To overcome this problem, we must determine the number and the expected terms of future contracts.
THE NUMBER OF CONTRACTS
unchanged as Ci expires. Proposition 1 below shows that more than two contracts for the entire relationship is of no use to the buyer. PROPOSITION 1. Consider the relationship as governed by n contracts, each determined through negotiations once the preceding contract expires, except that the buyer specifies the first. If the buyer seeks only the seller with the highest innate value, n -2 contracts are redundant.
PROOF. Let these contracts be labelled according to their chronological order, their durations be T1, T2, ..., Tn-I oo and P I P2, ... , P,n, the correspondin prices. Denote the buyer's beliefs at dates T1, T1 + T2, ... , by 1A , /-2. respectively. As there is no external uncertainty, we must have ,u l < /2 < "' -<cn_ ? 1 under Bayesian updating; otherwise these contracts cannot be optimal (ruled out by sequential rationality.) Consider now the first two contracts.
/1I /-C2 implies that there are types who accept the first but not the second contract, i.e., some seller types leave the relationship at date T1 for their outside option where the equivalent price is p. Now recall (4'): p I -p. This implies tha the types who quit the buyer at date T1 would be better-off rejecting the first contract. The rationality hypothesis eliminates these seller types and we come to the conclusion that /,u1 = /2. Initially then, the buyer can offer a combination of th first and the second contract, the duration of this new contract would be T1 + T2, and the price, some linear combination of PI and P2 but lower than p. This eliminates one contract. Carrying this reasoning one step further, we must have /2 = ,L3 for the same reasons why ,uc = ,u2, which eliminates another contrac
Apply the same logic inductively until the nth contract. This will eliminate n -2 contracts, leaving us with two. Q.E.D.
Under an optimal sequence of contracts, the participation constraint of the seller selected for the last contract must be binding. Therefore all types eliminated by a second screening would do better rejecting the first contract; doing so, they would obtain U0 and avoid the welfare loss [(1 -e -rT)/r](p -pI). This is the essential factor that restricts the number of contracts. 12
Redundancy of more than two contracts may seem counter-intuitive. There is no commitment for the terms of future contracts, so why should not the buyer attempt a second screening? Paradoxically, it is this lack of commitment that restricts her choice at the renewal date. Initially, the low innate value seller will foresee the buyer's incentive for a second screening if ,tl is low, and make no mistake; he will 12 Proposition 1 holds under n possible innate values provided that the buyer seeks only the seller with the highest innate value. It also holds under two-sided incomplete information, more precisely, if we allow for many buyer types who differ in the utility they derive from quality. If each buyer type prefers more quality to less, all would seek the OH-seller. The screening process is not affected, thus the result in Proposition I holds. The case of interest is, of course, a more general one in which a long-term relationship with m out of n possible innate values provides the buyer a welfare higher than V?. Although a sequence of two contracts for the entire relationship is again feasible, we have no results proving its optimality from the buyer's perspective. Deriving the optimal number of contracts with endogenous lengths and prices for this general case seems to be a formidable task, beyond the scope of this paper. See, however, Section 7 where we also discuss the use of contracts to achieve a matching between buyer and seller types. 
reject the first contract. Almost all type-related information should therefore be revealed during the first contract, that is, we should expect /x 1= in equilibrium. This result, and the underlying interaction between seller-types are made precise in To chara boundar Hence, f correspo (6) T(p1) = (1Ir) In {(P2 --(6) is well-defined only if P2 > p. Combined with (4') it yields the dynamics of prices: p I _<P < P 2. Since the seller "suffers" during the screening process (the first contract) he must somehow expect a compensation, which explains why p < P 2 From (6), we have T(p 1) --> oo as pi I--> p from below, and forp I = 0, it follows that the maximum duration of the first contract is T(w) = (oIlr) In { P 2/Pi. The pairs { p is T} that satisfy (4') and (5') are depicted in Figure 2 by the shaded area. Note that U(T) depends on the buyer's decision on whether to keep the seller (b = 1) or not (b = 0), and in the affirmative, on the negotiated price P 2 . We have U(T) = p2/r if b = 1, and U(T) = U0 otherwise. The strategies mentioned above must form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, thus sequential rationality given beliefs, and that beliefs be obtained wherever possible using Bayes' rule is required. To summarize,
(El) b is optimal for the buyer given her beliefs ,IAOHJq) and P2;
(E2) {a, x} is optimal for the seller given { p I, T } and the fact that the buyer's decision b will depend on quality;
(E3) { PI, T } is optimal for the buyer given subsequent strategies; and (E4) the buyer uses Bayes' rule to derive jtt(OH q) from her prior and the quality she has been observing.
We have omitted the arguments in the strategies in (El) through (E4) if /u < puc. We shall impose no restriction on the outcome of the negotiations for the case ,u > ,tc. Qualitatively, our results are independent of the bargaining scheme that parties choose to divide the pie provided that the seller obtains a share however small. All that matters is that the parties implicitly know or anticipate how the outcome of the negotiations (P2 (,)) will vary as a function of the situation (/u) at date T. For any p*2 > p that emerges as a bargaining outcome, one can verify that there exists a set of pairs { Pip T} that satisfy (4') and (5') though this set gets smaller as p* -> p. The price p (1) that comes across the bargain when the seller proves OH iS of particular interest for the following sections.
an updating rule by (El), (E2) and (E4), given
Denoting by q* the equilibrium level of quality, we specify off the equilibrium path beliefs by: ,u = 1 if q > q* and ,u = XTif q < q*. Last, by (8) PROOF. We first verify that the strategies described in the proposition form a continuation equilibrium. Given ,tt* = 1, b* = 1 is clearly optimal for the buyer since V(p*(1), 1) > V?. On the other hand, setting a* = 0 is optimal for all OL-sellers whose f3 <,f, because given the buyer's posterior and strategy, we h
(1 -e-rT) [pi -d(,B; xm (,B) )] + e Tp (1) < p. Given {p 1, T}, x (/3) as defined by (8) corresponding maximum effort induced on the {OL, ,3}-seller falls into the interval [0, A) in Figure 3 . We remark that all pairs { PI, T} that lie in region-I of Figure 4 are dominated by the T( p 1) locus, defined earlier in (6) as the maximum duration that a OH-seller would accept as a function of p 1. Since quality is not affected and P I < P 2, the buyer would enhance her welfare by increasing the duration until T = T(p 1). Her discounted welfare along the T(p 1) locus is constant and, using (6) in (3), equal to (OH -p)lr. It is interesting that this welfare is just equal to the welfare the buyer would enjoy if her facing a OH-seller were initially common knowledge. 13
Region-II is the northwestern neighbor of region-I in Figure 4 . Along the frontier between these two regions, T1 (p 1), we have X H = 0 and (8) holds for x6'L (/3) = OH -OL. Here, OH-sellers choose X*O H = 0, and the {OL, ,B}-seller is indifferent between a* = 0 and exerting x 0L(83), an effort just enough to fill the quality gap OH -OL. This corresponds to point A in Figure 3 . If, starting from the TI(p 1) locus, PI is increased and/or T is decreased, all OH-sellers regardless of their ,3, supply a positive effort given by X*H = X (f) -(OH -OL) . For if they don't, they risk being outperformed by OL-sellers.
Finally, region-III in Figure 4 is associated with the highest effort levels and quality (but, as we shall show, high quality is not costless to obtain). Competition between OH and OL-sellers is so strong that even some effort averse OH-sellers The dependence of quality on the price and the duration of the first contract as given in Proposition 3 is generated by the competition for the second contract.
Since the OH-seller is able to negotiate a price higher than p for the second contract, increasing p 1 or decreasing T induces the OH-seller to increase effort and quality in order to outperform the OL-seller.
The Optimal First Contract. The buyer's objective is naturally to obtain
the highest possible quality as cheap as possible for the longest period of time, but Proposition 3 stipulates that these goals are in conflict. The optimal first contract { p*, T*} balances these effects.
Let q*(pl, T) denote the continuation equilibrium quality generated by the contract {p 1, T}. According to (E3) and our analysis of the continuation equilibrium, { p*, T*} will be the buyer's perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategy if {pI, T*} I argmax [q*(p1, T) -P +e +erT It is useful to characterize the two necessary conditions for an interior solution.
The first is given by: aq*lap1 = 1, or using q* = OL + xO(L3) and (9), (10) (10) balances the effect of a marginal increase in Pl, and (11), of a marginal increase in T on quality. The third term in (11) represents the cost incurred as a quality deterioration due to the weakened competition between seller types, whereas the first two terms, the benefit arising from increasing the duration at constant quality q*. As expected, the design of the optimal contract depends critically on the curvature of d(,3; x). There are two broad classes of possible outcomes.
PROPOSITION 4. The set of perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategies {p , T*} for the buyer lies either on the T(p 1) locus, or in region-II or III. In the latter case, the optimal first contract satisfies (10) and (11). PROOF. We have previously shown that any {Pl, T} that lies in region-I is dominated by the T(pl) locus. What remains to show is the existence of a nontrivial optimal contract {jp*, T*} (perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategy) that falls into region-II or III when (10) and (11) hold. To be well-defined, this contract must satisfy p* ? p and T* > 0. The first is already implied by (4'). As for T* > 0, note that for any p*1 satisfying (10), i.e., 0'(J3;) = 1, (11) becomes positive as T -> 0 (which means T should be increased.) Thus T* = 0 cannot be optimal and {p*j, T*} must satisfy (10) and (11) if it lies in region-II or III. Q.E.D. {p *, T*} will lie on the T_(p 1 ) locus when quality is rather insensitive to the price and/or duration of the first contract. This is equivalent to saying that the two instruments, p 12 and T, are too costly to induce additional effort. When T is short, the effort xOL (/3) that the {OL, ,3}-seller is willin should be clear from (8) We close this section with a discussion on the efficiency of equilibrium efforts.
Since quality is not contractible, there is no direct link between efforts and prices.
Therefore, the inefficiency of the equilibrium described in this section should not be surprising. Prices rather serve screening purposes, and effort, if any, comes about as a by-product of this process. Consider an equilibrium with positive effort. The {OL, ,B}-seller's effort (xo"(/3)) is efficient because (10) holds; but this seller is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the proposed contract. On the other hand, all OH-sellers provide the same quality, but because their cost of effort depends on their /3, those who have higher ,Bs suffer less (provide the same qual with less effort). From this feature of the equilibrium, we can see whether the OH-seller's effort is excessive or not as a function of his ,B, the price P1 and th duration T. Clearly, the {OH, /}-seller's effort is less than efficient because, although he has the same effort-disutility function as the { OL, ,B}-seller, he enjoys high innate value. He can thus signal his innate value with an effort lesser than x OL(t3), the efficient effort for the effort-disutility function of the type /3. On the other hand, the {OH, g}-seller's effort may be excessive, that is, his marginal cost of effort may exceed the marginal value of the quality produced. Generally, the most effort-averse types of the OH-seller will exert excessive efforts for high values of p 1 and/or short durations. This will indeed be the case if the contract lies on the TII(pl) locus in Figure 4 . As explained in Section 4.2, both the {IOL, /3} and {IOH, P}-sellers are indifferent between accepting and rejecting a contract on the T,, (P 1) locus. Given that the indifference condition holds for both seller types, the absolute effort disutility of the two must be equal. For this contract, we know that the { OL ,B }-seller's effort is efficient. But by (A2), the marginal cost of effort for the { 1OH9 3 }-seller is necessarily higher than the { O1, ,B}-seller at the same level of effort disutility, which implies that the { 8H' ,B}-seller (and other most effort-averse types) exerts an excessive effort if the initial contract lies on the T1 1 (p 1) locus.
THE VALUE OF TYPE-RELATED INFORMATION
To sum up and sharpen the results presented so far: when noncontractible quality is affected by effort and the seller's innate value, a sequence of two contracts allows the buyer to use the duration of the initial contract, in conjunction with price, as a device to screen the OH-seller. The latter signs the initial contract for a price lower than his outside option, anticipating the high price he will later be able to negotiate with the buyer, when the relationship converts into a bilateral trade under perfect information. As a consequence of the competition between seller types during the initial contract, the OH-seller may use effort if necessary. This phenomenon manifests itself in many relationships. For example, employees do their best during probationary contracts to convey various type-related information (such as ability to work in a team, discipline, creativeness, etc.) and the by-product of the effort used in this process is a high performance, which clearly benefits employers.
Another example perhaps closer to the reader is assistant professors' efforts to signal research and teaching abilities, and thereby avoid being denied tenure. The department enjoys both type-related information and high productivity. In vertical relations, the supplier of a specific input puts much effort to convince the buyer that the inherent quality of the input is high and thereby to obtain an increase in volume/price of future orders. In all these cases, the increase in the buyer-'s welfare is closely linked to the twofold role of effort: transmission of information and improvement of "quality." One is then led to ask whether the value of information about the seller's type is nonpositive in an incomplete-contracts setting; more precisely, whether the buyer would be worse-off if types were common knowledge.
The two parties can never reach the first-best outcome when quality is not contractible, regardless of the buyer's information about the seller's type. The buyer is exposed to the seller's opportunism. However, since the seller never needs exerting effort when his type is known, qluality is strictly higher ulnder hidden information if the corresponding eqliilibriutn exhibits a positive effort level. The proof of this proposition follows from the fact that if the seller exerts no effort in the equilibrium of the hidden information case, then the two cases yield the same welfare to the buyer (because the participation constraint of the OH-seller is binding in both cases). Consider now an optimal contract {p*, T*} which induces effort in the hidden information case. Clearly, this contract must be superior to any other contract, including those under which the seller exerts no effort. Thus the buyer must be better-off by being ignorant of the seller's type.
(Al) and (A2) and our assumptions on the utility functions of the two parties are quite restrictive, but keep the analysis simple and clear. We can easily identify two main factors behind the result in Proposition 5. The first is noncontractibility of quality. If quality were contractible, the seller could be induced to choose the efficient level of effort, hence type-related information could not have a negative value. The second factor is the interaction between two hidden types and noncontractibility of quality, as a result of which the use of effort in signaling the type creates the potential for enhancing the buyer's welfare. But this effect vanishes when the seller's type is common knowledge.14 design. It has been argued that ignoring credentials in promotion decisions actually eliminates a real cost for the organization, the cost arising from what Milgrom (1988) calls "influence activities." Proposition 5 suggests additional gains: ignoring credentials (some of which are type-related information) will not only lead candidates to reallocate their efforts to productive uses, but also to a further increase in performance due to the competition between types, despite the incompleteness of contracts. The idea is a familiar one in game theory: in order to induce others (seller-types) to play in a desirable way, a player (the buyer) may actually gain from limiting her own information if others know she has done so.
COMMITMENT
A variant of the governance structure studied in Section 4 allows commitments to verifiable variables (prices and durations) beyond the actual period. We denote the corresponding long-term contract by CL = { PI , T, P2} and allow this contract.
to include a clause authorizing the buyer to decide upon the continuation of the relationship at date T (she is free to keep the seller (b = 1) or switch (b = 0)). This clause gives a best chance to the commitment about P2 though we shall point out the case where it becomes effective. Because commitments for verifiable variables are enforceable and the parties' objectives conflict, any proposal to modify P2 at date T will be vetoed either by the buyer or the seller, so there is no room for P2 being renegotiated.1I Then, continuation at the specified price P2 brings forth the expected discounted utility V(p2, 0) = (jttOH + (1 -)OL -p2)/r to the buyer.
So the optimal long-term contract { p TC, p2C} solves max [(1 -er7) + X -p + e -T max {V?, V(p2 {p,,T,P2} r subject to (4') and (5'), to the fact that the seller determines x through (7), and that ,u be obtained through the Bayes' rule. Note that the dynamics of prices, p I <P P2, must hold. But because P2 is fixed, the continuous link between the seller's effort and P2 disappears: provided that effort is high enough to convince the buyer for the continuation of the relationship, the seller will obtain the prespecified price P2 from date T on. Although we shall not characterize in detail optimal long-term contracts (there are many), we note that with the slight modification mentioned above, the solution concept used in the noncommitment case applies here as well.
We shall classify long-term contracts according to the buyer's posterior 1U at the interim date T. Given P2, Figure 5 contract and exerts no extra effort (x 0F = 0), so q = OH. The southeastern border of region-I is the T(p 1) locus which defines the maximum duration of the first period as a function of p 1. Thus the T(p l) locus in Figure 5 coincides with that in Figure 4 if P2 is specified at the level that would be determined through negotiations, i.e., when P2 = p*(1). To the northwest lies region-IL, the set of pairs {Pi, T} that yield a continuum of posteriors ju E [pu', 1). Again, the OH-sell accepts the contract and puts x -O0, but the OL-seller may also accept and find it worthwhile exerting an effort just enough to mimic the OH-seller. This too yields q = OH during the first period [0, T). Because PI < P2 and quality is constant throughout region-I and II, it is optimal for the buyer to choose the highest possible T. Doing so, the buyer obtains the same quality, pays a low price for a longer period and increases her expected welfare from the second period. We can thus eliminate region-I and II, both dominated by the T(p 1) locus. With respect to the dependence of quality on {p P, T} in region-Ill, Proposition 3 applies. Here the buyer has a weaker incentive to choose p I and T in region-III than in the noncommitment case because the seller keeps effort low at a level that yields the constant posterior ,u' where ,* = 1 guarantees higher effort levels in the noncommitment case.
As the foregoing discussion shows, to prespecify P2 is not beneficial for the An interesting question that arises is which contractual arrangement achieves an efficient matching between buyer and seller types when quality is not contractible.
To deal with this problem, the model should be extended to allow for many quality dimensions (in this paper we have only one.) The possible types of the buyer and the seller, as well as the preferences of each type should be defined on this quality space. In the case of labor services, the quality dimensions may include speed, creativeness, work discipline, cooperativeness, or any other job-specific ability.
The complication arises from the fact that the terms of the proposed contracts will convey information about the buyer's type. Thus, relationships involve learning on both sides, and the buyer too may act strategically and conceal her type. However, if we have an equilibrium where buyer types separate, the problem reduces to the one analyzed in this paper, as a consequence more than two contracts for the relationship is redundant. The seller will exert an effort sufficient to eliminate the possibility of being imitated by the "neighbor" types, and matching will obtain at Shapiro's (1989) principle of negative protection. The key factors behind the result that the buyer may benefit from the hidden information "problem" are noncontractible quality (contract incompleteness) and the screening process through which the seller conveys type information.
Given that quality is not contractible, competition between seller types to signal a high innate value provides incentives to exert effort, whereas under complete information this incentive effect disappears. Because hidden information about abilities is a common phenomenon in the beginning of relationships, the fact that young employees are more productive can be explained in terms of the screening process and career concerns. And the high performance generated by the screening process may make employers better-off under hidden information.
The use of a continuous-time framework has allowed us to show the importance of time as a screening device, which underlies as well most of the results derived in models of strikes and bargaining under incomplete information. Regarding the link between prices, durations and quality, the analysis identifies a trade-off. Decreasing the duration of a probationary contract brings the critical continuation decision forward in time, and given the expected value of continuation, the seller enjoys avoiding some discounting, which in turn increases the competition between seller types. The result is higher effort and quality for the buyer. But the improvement in quality must be high enough to offset the cost of decreasing the duration, which is balanced by the optimal first contract. This trade-off provides an explanation for differential durations of probationary contracts as a function of the importance of screening considerations.
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